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Introduction 
Martin Stuart (“Marty”) Feldstein, a renowned American economist who has 
made important contributions to public finance, macroeconomics, social 
insurance, health economics, the economics of national security, and many 
other fields of economics, was born in New York City on November 25, 1939.  
He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College with a major in 
economics in 1961, and even though he was admitted by the Harvard Medical 
School, he opted to study at the University of Oxford.  He received a B.Litt. in 
1963 and a Ph.D. in 1967, both in economics, from Oxford, but combined his 
interest in medicine and economics by writing a doctoral dissertation about how 
hospital costs could be reduced in a government-run health system.  He was a 
Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, from 1964 until 1967 before returning to 
the States and to his alma mater.  He became an Assistant Professor of 
Economics at Harvard University in 1967, and only two years later at the age of 
28, he was granted tenure and promoted to full professor, becoming one of the 
youngest full professors in Harvard’s history.  It was in England that Feldstein 
met and married his wife Kathleen, an economist in her own right who received 
a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
Feldstein is currently George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard 
University and President Emeritus of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. (NBER) and is still very active in teaching and research.  He has 
written close to 400 scholarly articles on a broad range of topics, many of which 
show, via careful theoretical and empirical analysis, that government tax and 
transfer policies have important impacts on the economic behaviour of 
households and firms--in other words that households and firms respond to 
incentives and disincentives--and that the impact of tax and transfer policies 
cannot be gauged accurately unless one takes account of the behavioural 
responses that they induce. 
In recognition of his impressive research achievements, Feldstein was awarded 
the John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association (AEA), 
which at the time was awarded every two years to the economist under the age 
of 40 who is judged to have made the greatest contribution to economic science, 
in 1977.  Moreover, he was elected President of the American Economic 
Association in 2004 and is one of the twelve most influential living economists 
in the world according to IDEAS/RePEc.  In 2007, he received the Bradley 
Prize from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation; in 2011, he was included 
in the 50 Most Influential ranking of Bloomberg Markets magazine; and in 2012, 
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he received the SIEPR Prize for Contributions to Economic Policy from the 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) of Stanford 
University. 
Feldstein has been regarded as a perennial favorite to win the Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences and was named a Thomson Reuters Citation Laureate 
(many of whom have gone on to win Nobel Prizes) in 2008. 
 
Feldstein’s Contribution to Social Insurance 
Feldstein has made significant contributions to a broad range of fields in 
economics, but one area in which he has truly revolutionized the thinking of 
economists and policymakers alike is in the area of social insurance (see 
Feldstein (2005a) for a useful overview).  Feldstein showed that, while existing 
social insurance programs protect individuals from a variety of risks, they also 
distort individuals’ behaviour in a variety of ways, thereby lowering saving, 
economic growth, and welfare.  For example, unemployment insurance protects 
individuals from the loss of income during unemployment spells but at the same 
time causes individuals to search for new jobs for too long, induces them to 
save less, and encourages them to take jobs that have a greater likelihood of 
seasonal and/or cyclical layoffs.  Social security (public old-age pensions) 
protects individuals from poverty during old age and longevity risk but at the 
same time induces individuals to reduce their saving and to retire too early.  
Health insurance protects individuals from the risk of being unable to afford 
needed medical care but at the same time induces them to consume too much 
health care, to take inadequate precautions with their health, and to save too 
little because they know that they will not have to bear the full cost themselves. 
Feldstein has done extensive research to show that social insurance programs 
have indeed distorted individuals’ behaviour in the expected ways.  For example, 
Feldstein (1976b, 1978a) shows that unemployment insurance substantially 
increases the amount of temporary layoff unemployment, while Feldstein and 
Poterba (1984) show that the higher is the replacement rate of unemployment 
benefits, the higher is the reservation wage of unemployed workers, meaning 
that the longer will be the duration of unemployment.   
Turning to Feldstein’s work on the impact of social security (see Feldstein and 
Liebman (2002b) for a useful overview), Feldstein (1974), a very well-known 
article, analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of social security on 
household consumption and saving behaviour.  As Feldstein notes, there are at 
least two offsetting ways in which a social security system can affect household 
saving.  On the one hand, the introduction of a social security system will cause 
households to not feel as much need to save for retirement as they did before the 
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introduction of such a system (the wealth replacement effect).  On the other 
hand, the introduction of a social security system will induce households to 
retire earlier, lengthen their retirement span, and make it necessary for them to 
save more than before (the induced retirement effect).   Thus, it is not clear a 
priori if the introduction of a social security system will induce households to 
save more or less than before.  However, Feldstein has shown using a variety of 
data that the wealth displacement effect dominates the induced retirement effect, 
as a result of which the net effect of the public pension system is to lower 
household saving and capital accumulation.  For example, Feldstein (1974, 
1982c, and 1996b) shows using time-series data for the United States that social 
security has substantially increased personal consumption (and by implication 
has substantially reduced personal saving).１  Similarly, Feldstein (1977, 1980) 
estimates the magnitudes of both the wealth displacement effect and the induced 
retirement effect using cross-country data and shows that the former is larger in 
absolute magnitude than the latter, as a result of which social security reduces 
private saving, on balance. 
Turning to Feldstein’s work on health insurance (see Feldstein (1995c) for a 
useful overview), Feldstein (1970) finds that the price of physicians’ services 
rose much faster than the consumer price index after the introduction of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, suggesting that these health insurance 
programs increased the demand for physicians’ services, thereby bidding up the 
price.  Similarly, Feldstein (1973) estimates a demand function for health care 
using time series data on individual states of the United States and finds that 
health insurance has a significant impact on the demand for health care.   
Moreover, after establishing that social insurance programs have indeed 
distorted the behaviour of individuals as theory would predict, Feldstein has 
then gone on to make recommendations about how to reform these programs so 
that they continue to protect individuals from the risks they are designed to 
protect them from while at the same alleviating the distortions they cause 
including the reductions in saving that they cause.  For example, Feldstein 
proposes reforming the current unemployment insurance system by making 
benefits taxable (as they are now, due in large part to Feldstein’s own efforts), 
reducing replacement rates, and/or (better yet) introducing a more fundamental 
reform involving the introduction of unemployment insurance saving accounts 
earmarked to pay benefits when unemployment occurs (see, for example, 
Feldstein and Altman (2007)).   
Similarly, Feldstein proposes a transition from the current pay-as-you-go social 
security system to a mixed system with a substantial investment-based (funded) 
component (see, for example, Feldstein (1995a, 1996a, 1997, 1998, 2005b, and 
2009a), Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998a, 1998b, and 2002), Feldstein and 
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Ranguelova (2001), and Feldstein and Liebman (2002a)).   Economists have 
traditionally felt that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make the transition from 
a pay-as-you-go social security system to a mixed system or a fully funded 
system because one generation will have to bear a so-called “double burden,” 
financing the social security benefits of its parents’ generation as well as its own 
benefits, but Feldstein shows in the aforementioned papers that this is not an 
insurmountable problem. 
Finally, Feldstein proposes a transition from the current pay-as-you-go 
comprehensive low-deductible low-coinsurance Medicare system (the U.S. 
federal health care program for those over the age of 65) to a health savings 
account (HSA) system that creates strong incentives to choose high deductibles 
and high coinsurance (see, for example, Feldstein (1971, 1999a), Feldstein and 
Gruber (1995), and Feldstein and Samwick (1997)).  Tax-advantaged health 
savings accounts have been available to taxpayers who have a high-deductible 
health plan (HDHP) since 2003, and these accounts could provide a model for 
Medicare reform. 
A related paper (Feldstein (1995b)) pertains to college scholarships, which are 
not a form of social insurance narrowly defined but which have similar 
distortive effects on individual behaviour.  Feldstein (1995b) shows that college 
scholarships are beneficial in that they enable the children of low-income 
families to attend college but distortive in that expected parental contributions 
are higher and the amounts of financial assistance lower if parental assets are 
higher.  This implies a hefty “education tax rate” on saving and strongly 
discourages parents from saving. 
Feldstein’s Contribution to Public Finance 
Feldstein’s second major contribution to economics is in the area of public 
finance.  Feldstein has shown in a long series of papers that taxes distort the 
behavior of households and firms, causing substantial deadweight losses, and 
that one needs to take full account of the behavioral response of households and 
firms to tax changes when estimating their impact.  For example, Feldstein 
(1995a, 1995d, 1999b) estimated the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
using the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to changes in 
tax rates, which allows one to take account of the fact that tax changes would 
affect not only labor supply but also the forms of compensation, the investment 
of assets, and the extent of spending on tax-deductible activities (see Feldstein 
and Feenberg (1996) for a similar analysis of the 1993 tax rate increases).  
Feldstein has also argued that tax policies have had the effect of depressing 
saving and investment, thereby causing a substantial deadweight loss and 
lowering economic growth (see Feldstein (1995e) for a useful survey).   We 
5 
 
have already discussed the saving-depressing effects of various social insurance 
programs, but the tax system also has the effect of depressing saving.  The 
combination of the corporate income tax and  personal income taxes on interest, 
dividends, and capital gains creates a substantial wedge between the pre-tax 
marginal product of capital and the net return received by individual savers (i.e., 
it raises the effective tax rate on capital income), which depresses saving, 
investment, and economic growth. 
Feldstein (1976a, 1978b, 1978c, 1995e) points out that, when doing a welfare 
analysis, the deadweight loss arising from the current tax system must be 
compared to the deadweight loss of the tax system that replaces it, and Feldstein 
(1995e) shows that a shift from the current income tax to a consumption tax or a 
labor income tax will increase national saving and reduce the deadweight loss of 
the overall tax system. 
Feldstein has also analyzed the distortionary effects of specific taxes.  For 
example, Feldstein and Yitzhaki (1978) show that capital gains taxes have 
discouraged the sale of equities and reduced tax revenue via the lock-in effect 
and that cutting the capital gains tax would increase tax revenues by 
encouraging investors to realize their capital gains.   
 
As another example, Feldstein (1981) shows that the use of "historic cost" 
method of depreciation for tax purposes implies that higher inflation rates 
reduce the real value of future depreciation deductions and therefore raise the 
real net cost of investment, that the rise in the real net cost of investment can be 
substantial at recent inflation rates, and that allowing accelerated depreciation 
and valuing depreciation at replacement cost for tax purposes are alternate ways 
of alleviating the biases caused by the use of “historical cost” depreciation. 
 
As yet another example, Feldstein has written a series of papers on the impact 
of tax breaks for charitable contributions on the amount of charitable giving (see, 
for example, Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976)).  These papers find that the 
elasticity of charitable giving with respect to the price or net cost of giving is 
slightly greater than one, which implies that any reduction in price will increase 
the total contributions received by charitable organizations by more than the 
reduction in tax revenue. 
 
Moreover, Feldstein has also shown that the distortions caused by the tax 
system are exacerbated by the interaction between an unindexed tax system 
interacts and high inflation (see Feldstein (1983b) for a collection of a number 
of his papers on this topic).  For example, inflation increases households’ 
nominal incomes and pushes them into higher and higher tax brackets, thereby 
raising their marginal tax rates (a phenomenon called “bracket creep”).  
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Similarly, Feldstein (1983b, 1995e) has shown that inflation distorts the 
measurement of capital income and raises the effective tax rate on the return to 
saving.  For example, because nominal interest income and nominal capital 
gains (the nominal increase in asset values) are taxed at the personal level, 
interest income and capital gains are overstated and overtaxed when there is 
inflation.  Furthermore, because depreciation is understated and inventory 
profits are overstated when there is inflation, corporate income is overstated and 
overtaxed (although the fact that nominal interest payments can be deducted 
from profits works in the opposite direction).  For example, Feldstein and 
Summers (1978) show that, on balance, the high rates of inflation in the United 
States in the 1970s raised the effective tax rate on corporate income 
substantially, and Feldstein (1982a) shows that this, in turn, has substantially 
reduced business investment in the United States since the late 1960s.  
Moreover, Feldstein (1982b) shows that the interaction between the tax code 
and inflation has distorted not only the size of the capital stock but also the 
allocation of capital between business capital and housing capital, leading to too 
little of the former and too much of the latter. 
The Feldstein-Horioka Paradox or Puzzle 
One of Feldstein’s best known papers is Feldstein and Horioka (1980), his joint 
paper with Charles Yuji Horioka on international capital mobility (see also 
Feldstein (1983a) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991)).  In this paper, the 
authors regress the domestic investment rate on the domestic saving rate using 
cross-section data on OECD member countries for the 1960-74 period and find 
that the coefficient of the domestic saving rate (subsequently referred to as the 
“saving retention coefficient”) is significantly different from zero but not 
significantly different from one.  If capital markets are fully integrated and 
capital flows freely across national borders in search of the highest return, this 
coefficient should be zero (at least in the case of small economies).  The fact 
that it is not significantly different from one suggests (in the absence of legal 
and other restrictions on international capital flows) that “home bias” is strong 
and that people strongly prefer to invest their saving in their home country.  
This result generated considerable interest and surprise because many 
economists had assumed that capital had become perfectly mobile 
internationally, and it came to be known as the “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle or 
paradox.”  It spawned a voluminous literature trying to verify and/or explain the 
result (see Coakley, Kulasi, and Smith (1998) and Apergis and Tsoumas (2009) 
for surveys of this literature), it was included in Obsfeldt and Rogoff’s (2001) 
list of the “six major puzzles in international macroeconomics,” it is covered in 
many, if not most, textbooks in macroeconomics and international economics, 
and it is one of the most frequently cited papers in international economics.  
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The findings of this paper are important for a number of reasons.  First, they 
shed light on the true nature of the world capital market and on the extent to 
which capital markets are integrated.  Second, they confirm that it is appropriate, 
at least as a first approximation, to study income distribution in general and tax 
incidence in particular using models that ignore international capital mobility. 
Third, they imply that the national return on domestic saving is approximately 
equal to the pre-tax domestic marginal product of capital since such saving 
increases the domestic capital stock rather than either flowing abroad or 
replacing foreign investment at home.  
Feldstein’s Contribution to the Economics of National Security 
In recent years, Feldstein has become increasingly interested in the economics 
of national security, which had not attracted the interest of economists until he 
came along.  In addition to conducting research on various topics relating to 
national security, Feldstein has been advising graduate students on topics 
relating to national security, started a new graduate course on the Economics of 
National Security at Harvard shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, 
heads the Working Group on the Economics of National Security at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, and founded the Economics of 
National Security Association (ENSA) in 2013. 
To cite two examples of Feldstein’s work in this area, Feldstein (2008) proposes 
ways of reforming the institutions for domestic counterterrorism (CT) in the 
United States and of strengthening cooperation among the CT activities of the 
U.S. and its allies, while Feldstein (2009b) draws lessons from the 1930s to 
make recommendations concerning economic and national security policies for 
the United States today, one of which is to increase the scale and funding of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland 
Security to prepare for the threats of domestic terrorism and cyber attacks that 
did not exist in the 1930s. 
Feldstein’s Contribution to the National Bureau of Economic Research 
Moreover, Feldstein has contributed significantly to the development of the 
field of economics through his administrative roles as well.  For example, he 
became President of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (NBER), 
the U.S.’s leading non-profit economic research organization, in 1977 at the 
tender age of 37.  He served in this capacity until he retired in 2008 (except in 
1982-84, when he was Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisers under 
President Reagan), and the NBER expanded and prospered enormously during 
his 29 years at the helm.  He organized the NBER into Programs and Working 
Groups and attracted the best empirical economists in every field.  One 
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indication of the NBER's prominence is that 24 Nobel Prize winners in 
Economics and 13 past Chairs of the President's Council of Economic Advisers 
have been researchers at the NBER. 
Feldstein is still active at the NBER as President Emeritus and Director of the 
Working Group on the Economics of National Security.  Moreover, to honor 
Feldstein’s outstanding tenure as President, the NBER inaugurated the Martin 
Feldstein Lecture, an annual lecture by an outstanding economist, in 2009.  The 
first Martin Feldstein Lecture was given by John B. Taylor of Stanford 
University, followed by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., of TIAA-CREF (a former Vice 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve System), Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard 
University, Stephen N. Kaplan of the University of Chicago, Lawrence H. 
Summers of Harvard University, and Stanley Fischer, Vice-Chair of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Feldstein’s Contribution to Economic Policymaking 
In addition, Feldstein has been deeply involved in economic policymaking for 
much of his career.  In 1982-84, he served for two years as Chairperson of the 
Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan and spoke out strongly 
about the dangers of ballooning federal government deficits.  He served on the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 2007 to 2009 under 
President Bush (the son), and in 2009, he was named to President Obama’s 
Economic Recovery Advisory Board.   
Feldstein currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Trilateral Commission, the Group of 30 (a Washington-based 
financial advisory body), and the National Committee on United States-China 
Relations and was formerly on the Boards of Directors of a number of major 
corporations including AIG, Eli Lilly, and JP Morgan. 
With respect to the specific policies upon which Feldstein had an influence, he 
was instrumental in cutting the capital gains tax and making unemployment 
compensation benefits taxable and has long been an avid advocate of social 
security reform, was instrumental in implementing a tax reform that made social 
security benefits taxable in the case of high-income households, and was one of 
the main driving forces behind former President George W. Bush's initiative of 
partial privatization of the social security system.  Moreover, one of his 
disciples, Jose Pinera, privatized Chile’s pension system and converted it into a 
fully funded system based on personal retirement accounts as Secretary of 
Labor and Social Security.   
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Feldstein’s Contribution to Economics Education 
Moreover, Feldstein has made a substantial contribution to economics education 
as well.  Most importantly, he has trained numerous prominent economists who 
went on to occupy the top echelons of government and academia, among them 
Alan J. Auerbach (Robert D. Burch Professor of Economics and Law, Director 
of the Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance, and formerly Chair of 
the Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley, and formerly 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation), Raj Chetty 
(professor at Harvard University, a 2012 MacArther Fellow, and recipient of the 
2013 John Bates Clark Medal), David T. Ellwood (professor and Dean of the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and formerly 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services), Douglas W. Elmendorf (Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office and formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Policy at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Senior Fellow at 
the Brookings Institution), Charles Yuji Horioka (Vea Family Professor of 
Technology and Evolutionary Economics Centennial at the University of the 
Philippines, Diliman, and recipient of the 2001 Japanese Economic Association-
Nakahara Prize), R. Glenn Hubbard (professor and Dean of the Business School 
at Columbia University and formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and Chairperson of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers), Steven N. Kaplan (Neubauer 
Family Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the 
University of Chicago and one of the top twelve Business School professors in 
the country according to Business Week), Jeffrey B. Liebman (Malcolm Wiener 
Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, and formerly Acting Deputy Director for Policy in the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget), Lawrence B. Lindsey (Chief Executive Officer of 
the Lindsey Group and formerly Director of the National Economic Council and 
member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), Jose Pinera 
(Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and formerly Chile’s 
Secretary of Labor and Social Security and Secretary of Mining and architect of 
Chile’s private pension system), James M. Poterba (professor and formerly 
Head of the Economics Department at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Feldstein’s successor as President of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, and formerly a member of the President’s Advisory Panel 
on Federal Tax Reform), Harvey S. Rosen (professor and formerly Chair of the 
Economics Department at Princeton University and formerly Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and member 
and Chairperson of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers), Jeffrey D. 
Sachs (Professor and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and 
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formerly Professor at Harvard University, advisor to many Latin American and 
post-Communist economies, and Special Adviser to two successive United 
Nations Secretaries-General on the Millennium Development Goals), Andrew A. 
Samwick (Sandra L. and Arthur L. Irving '72a, P'10 Professor of Economics and 
Director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for Public Policy and the Social 
Sciences, Dartmouth College, and formerly Chief Economist of the President’s 
Council of Economic Advisers), Joel Slemrod (Professor, Economics 
Department Chair, and Director of the Office of Tax Policy Research at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a member of the Congressional Budget 
Office Panel of Economic Advisers, and recipient of the 2001 Ig Noble Prize in 
Economics), Lawrence H. Summers (Professor and formerly President of 
Harvard University, recipient of the 1993 John Bates Clark Medal, and formerly 
Secretary of the Treasury, Chief Economist of the World Bank, and Chairperson 
of the President’s National Economic Council), and this is a very incomplete list.   
Furthermore, Feldstein taught the introductory course in economics at Harvard 
for twenty years, and this course was the most popular course on campus when 
he was teaching it, with more than 1000 enrollees.   
Finally, Feldstein also frequently writes OpEd pieces for the Wall Street Journal 
and other newspapers and makes policy proposals about a variety of economic 
issues.  In past years, he regularly co-authored such pieces with his economist 
wife Kathleen. 
Thus, Feldstein has made a remarkable contribution not only to the development 
of the field of economics but also to the conduct of economic policy as a 
researcher, research administrator, policy-maker, educator, and journalist.  That 
he has been able to accomplish so much in one lifetime is close to a miracle. 
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